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Comments
THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT OF 1917
AND FOREIGN-BASED SUBSIDIARIES OF
AMERICAN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS:
A TIME TO ABSTAIN FROM RESTRAINING
I say sir, that this is our country and no matter where companies
are owned which are operating in our country, on our natural
resources and on the wealth produced by our people, it must be
made clear, by legislation if necessary, that we in Canada sell
where we desire to sell.*
I. INMODUCTION
This forceful statement by a member of the Canadian Parlia-
ment may strike one as rather odd. Why can Canadians not sell
where they desire? Who could prevent Canada from going about
her own foreign trade business? When it is learned that the ATP
is complaining about the United States and its control over the
export trading practices of a major Canadian corporation, Ford
Ltd., surprise is in order. How, and more interestingly, why would
the United States exercise control over the transactions of a for-
eign corporation? What has become of Canada's national sover-
eignty? The answers concern an explosive and intriguing aspect
* House of Commons Debates, Speech of Mr. Winch, 19 May 1958,
I, p. 196, as quoted in Corcoran, The Trading with the Enemy Act and the
Controlled Canadian Corporation, 14 McGmL L.J. 174, 195 (1968).
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of multinational corporations, involve a conflict between national
and international law and furnish a basis for international dispute.
The issue is one of national sovereignty and conflicting attempts
at control1 over foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations
by the "home" and "host" countries.2 When restrictive legislation
of the home nation infringes on the host's right of self determina-
tion, the issue is joined.
The emergence of multinational corporations (MNC's) has given
rise to these problems of extraterritoriality3 and national sover-
eignty. The "multinational" aspect of such a corporation defines
its characteristic of cutting across traditional national boundaries
while the "corporation" aspect requires that ".... it must have a
single controlling brain and act throughout the world as if it were
one company. ' 4 Many nations feel that any corporation formed
under its laws and doing business within its borders is a citizen of
that country and therefore governed by its law.5 While at times
supporting this principle,6 the United States further asserts it has
the right to command allegiance to its law by American citizens,
corporate as well as individual, when they venture outside its ter-
ritory.7 A subsidiary formed under the laws of a host nation but
owned and controlled by a United States corporation can trigger
problems of conflicting allegiance.
The Ford Motor Company, for example, is an American corpo-
ration and prevented by United States law from trading with Red
China.8 Ford owns and controls Ford Ltd. of Canada, a Canadian
1. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transi-
tional Law, 83 HARv. L. REV. 739, 743 (1970).
2. In this comment, as in most literature on the subject, "home coun-
try" is defined as the nation wherein the world headquarters of the MNC
is located, while "host country" is the nation in which one or more of
the MNC's subsidiaries is incorporated and domiciled.
3. As used in this comment, "extraterritoriality" is to be understood
in accordance with BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 700-01 (rev. 4th ed. 1968):
"The extraterritorial operation of laws; that is, their operation upon per-
sons, rights, or jural relations, existing beyond the limits of the enacting
state, but still amenable to its laws."
4. Schmitthoff, Multinationals in Court, 1972 J. Bus. L. 103, 104.
5. P. JESsup, A. MoDEm LAW OF NATIONS 84 (1968).
6. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal Re-
straints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1530 (1961).
7. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
8, Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
corporation. Under American law the Detroit-based parent would
also be liable if its Canadian subsidiary traded with Red China.'
Canada, on the other hand, authorizes and may even encourage
such commerce. 10 In spite of this however, the United States has
effectively imposed its will over the Canadian corporation and pre-
vented any Communist dealings. Considering that American
MNC's control 97% of the automobile industry in Canada," and
that one of every seven Canadian jobs is related to the production
of cars,' 2 it is easy to appreciate the MiP's impassioned statement
and understand the problems to be discussed.
As will be seen, the United States is by far the most popular
home country for MNC's. From the broad range of U.S. attempts
at control,' 8 only that aspect concerning American foreign policy,
the Trading with the Enemy Act,' 4 will be examined in this com-
ment. Using three of our western allies, Canada, France and Great
Britain, as focal points, an examination of host country reactions
and responses to United States legal controls will be undertaken.
Conclusions drawn from this examination will then be used for a
look at the future and how the United States in particular should
prepare for it.
11. THE PROBLEM: MNC's AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Some understanding of the 1VINC is necessary before the issue
of their control can be discussed. The term 'multinational corpo-
ration', as used in this comment, is to be understood as a combina-
tion of several companies, each located in and possessing the na-
tionality of different countries, which companies are integrated by
means of shareholdings and managerial control into an economic
unit possessing centralized decision making control. It has one
main headquarters and acts throughout the world as if it were a
single corporationL' 5 Largely organized after 1955, the MNC is a
9. Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1970), 31
C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (1972).
10. Corcoran, The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Controlled Cana-
dian Corporation, 14 McGnL L.J. 174, 192-93 (1968).
11. TAsiK FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIA_ INDusTRY, FOREIGN OWN-
ERsHIP AND THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDusTRY (1968), cited in Baum,
The Global Corporation, An American Challenge to the Nation-State?,
55 IOWA L. REV. 410, 418 (1969). [Hereinafter cited as Watkins Report.]
12. Baum, The Global Corporation, An American Challenge to the Na-
tion-State?, 55 IowA L. REV. 410, 421 (1969).
13. Some other attempts at control included taxation on subsidiary
revenue, enforcement of anti-monopoly legislation and restrictions on di-
rect overseas investments.
14. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (1970).
15. Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skep-
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recent creation and has been represented as a "sharp break with
the past."16  This recent development would seem to explain in
part why the problem of their control is still open to inquiry.17
Their youth, however, should not belie their strength. By the
1980's and continuing throughout the remainder of this century,
it is estimated that 75% of the world's trade and production will
be controlled by 300 or fewer MNC's.18 Beyond this, however, is
the even more remarkable fact that approximately 90% of the
MNC's in the world are chartered and headquartered in the United
States.' 9 This staggering economic power managed from within
the United States can be seen as the basis for conflict. As stated
by a top authority in the field, Prof. Detlev F. Vagts of Harvard,
"[tlhere is an obvious temptation for the home country's authori-
ties to attempt to use their situation-possessing authority and
power over the nerve center of the enterprise-to extend their con-
trol down through the enterprise's links to the subsidiaries in other
countries.12 0  Further statistics confirm the potential for Ameri-
can control over the economic world.2'
Realizing the potential significance of whether the home or host
country has control over MNC's, let us consider the legal bases for
exerting it, both in national and international law. As a starting
point, a basic tenet of international law holds all individuals and
property within the territory of a nation to be under its dominio. 22
tic's Analysis, 3 L. & POLICY INT'L Bus. 1, 2 (1971), and Schmitthoff, supra
note 4.
16. Vagts, supra note 1, at 746-47.
17. The author believes this comment to be the first overview of U.S.
attempts at foreign strategic export control with emphasis on comparison
of varying foreign reactions.
18. Vagts, The Global Corporation and International Law, 6 J. IN='L
L. & Ecow. 247, 249 (1972), and Schmitthoff, supra note 4, at 103.
19. Vagts, supra note 18, at 250.
20. Id.
21. E.g., at the end of WW H a group of 187 American parent corpora-
tions possessed 1,000 foreign subsidiaries. By 1967, however, they con-
trolled over 5,500. Rubin, supra note 15, at 2. In 1970 American MNC's
made direct foreign investments of $68 billion, more than the rest of the
world combined. Rubin, supra note 15, at 6. In Canada, United States
firms account for 75% of all foreign holdings. Corcoran, supra note 10, at
187. Concerning a MNC previously mentioned, the Ford Motor Company
controls over 60 corporations, 40 of which are abroad. 36% of Ford's total
assets are invested in 27 foreign countries, and of 388,000 employees, 150,000
are located outside the United States. Vagts, supra note 1, at 749.
22. 1 L. OPPENHEnm, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 124 (8th ed. 1955).
Foreign citizens and property are therefore under the territorial
sovereignty of the state within whose borders they are located.2 3
Such foreign citizens, however, also remain under the personal
sovereignty of their home nation and are liable upon return for acts
committed abroad that are considered crimes by the country of
their nationality.24 The United States, recognizing these widely
accepted principles,25 has also adopted 26 a minority position2 7 that
a nation may have the right of jurisdiction over actions of foreign
citizens outside its borders when those acts have a substantial "ef-
fect" upon that nation or threaten its security.28 Such jurisdiction
can, of course, only be exercised when the actor enters its terri-
tory.29
Reflection on these principles indicates that control over the
same foreign subsidiary could be legally claimed by both the home
and host countries. Under the territoriality concept, a host na-
tion under whose law the subsidiary corporation was created and
in whose jurisdiction it is domiciled could claim control. This
would simply be the power to regulate the activities of one of its
own citizens, in exporting as well as numerous other areas. The
home country, on the other hand, could claim that the subsidiary is
nothing more than one of its citizens abroad. Since the corpora-
tion's activities in foreign countries are still subject to the home
country's law, enforcing sanctions against it or the parent corpo-
ration located within its borders would seem justified. Or if the
foreign subsidiary is not looked upon as one of its citizens by the
home country, it might still feel justified under the "effects" doc-
trine, if the subsidiary's actions caused a substantial and threat-
ening effect within its borders, to hold responsible the parent cor-
poration over which it has immediate and undisputed jurisdiction.
A crucial point in all these considerations is the citizenship of
the subsidiaries, for this will determine in large measure who will
claim what legal justification for control. While many nations,
including the United States, view a corporation as a citizen of the
23. Id.
24. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 309-11 (2d ed.
1966), and OPPEnEvi, supra note 22, at §§ 124, 145.
25. See State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d
455, 457 (1953), and RESTATEMaENT (SEcoN) OF THE FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW
oF HE UN=D STATEs § 30 (1965).
26. See RESTATmNT (SECOND) oF THE FORmGN RELATIONS LAW OF Tmn
UNMD STATES §§ 18, 33 (1965).
27. OPPENBEim, supra note 22, at § 147.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ME FoRmN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED
STATES § 18 (1965), and OPPENEnvi, supra note 22, at § 147.
29. Id.
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jurisdiction which created it, 30 it will probably not be surprising to
learn that the U.S. has created an exception for subsidiaries. Cor-
porations organized under a host country's laws, but owned and
controlled by a firm of another nation, are not viewed as possessing
the host's citizenship.
In Petition of Hines,31 a federal district court was faced with a
Panamanian corporation that was wholly owned by an American
firm. In deciding the case, the court held that one working for the
foreign company was actually working for a United States citizen
abroad, the corporation being a mere "receptacle" of the American
firm's foreign operations.32 The subsidiary was still an American
corporation even though domiciled in Panama. A later case in-
volving a wholly Canadian owned American corporation, Massey-
Ferguson, Ltd. v. Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co.,33 held that
the Canadian parent was subject to United States service of process
since it was found to be doing business in the district through its
subsidiary. 34 This would be difficult to understand unless ap-
proached from the viewpoint that the subsidiary was more Ca-
nadian than American in the eyes of the court.
Perhaps most unusual of all is the offering of the American Law
Institute in the restatement of American foreign relations law,
which discusses the nationality of corporations. 35 The black letter
rule states, "[a] corporation or other private legal entity has the
nationality of the state which creates it", but an official comment
reads:
d. Corporations owned or controlled by nationals of another
state. When the nationality of a corporation is different from the
nationality of the persons (individual or corporate) who own or
control it, the state of the nationality of such persons has juris-
diction to prescribe and to enforce in its territory, rules of law
governing their conduct. It is thus in a position to control the
conduct of the corporation even though it does not have jurisdic-
tion to prescribe rules directly applicable to the corporation.36
30. JEssuP, supra note 5 and Vagts, supra note 1, at 740.
31. 33 F. Supp. 141 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
32. Id.
33. 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964).
34. Id. at 714.
35. R.ESTATEMIENT (SEcoND) or THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 27 (1965).
36. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TmE UN=rs
STATES § 27, Comment d, (1965).
The Reporter's Note is even more specific, stating:
Corporations formed under the laws of foreign states but owned
or controlled by individuals or corporations who are nationals of
the United States, are potentially subject to varying degrees of
indirect control by the United States through its capacity to control
its own nationals. .... 37
It therefore appears that the United States as home country may
base control over foreign subsidiaries on one of two legal theories.
First, the subsidiary is actually an American citizen since it is
entirely owned and controlled by an American firm and it is there-
fore under the continuing personal jurisdiction of the United
States. Second, and in the alternative, while the subsidiary may
be a citizen of the foreign host country, it is still owned and oper-
ated by American citizens, individual or corporate, and these en-
tities are liable for its actions abroad which violate United States
law and/or cause substantial and detrimental effects within the
United States.
Many host countries, and in particular Canada and Great Britain,
employ the "state of incorporation test" for determining national-
ity. Being common law countries like the United States, they cling
to the traditional rule that the nationality of a corporation is de-
termined from the jurisdiction which chartered it. 38 As an apparent
result of the relatively few MNC's based there, however, these
nations do not appear to have created an exception for foreign
owned subsidiaries as has the United States. France, on the other
hand, determines the nationality of a corporation by location of the
siege social (registered head office) selected by the corporation
itself.30 Thus, any corporation having registered its own, and not
the multinational parent's, headquarters as being in France, is
governed by French law and generally considered to have French
nationality.40
Since most MNC's try to cultivate an image acceptable to the
public of the host country,4 1 it seems reasonable that American
firm's foreign subsidiaries located in France would register their
headquarters in France and become French, if for no other reason
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIoNs LAw OF T=E UNITED
STATES, § 27, Reporter's note (1965).
38. Vagts, supra note 1, at 740.
39. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 166-67 (1955),
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATiONS LAw OF THE UIrTED
STATES § 27, Comment c, (1965).
40. Craig, Application of the Trading with the Enemy Act to Foreign
Corporations owned by Americans: Reflections on Freuhauf v. Massey, 83
HAxv. L. REv. 579, 590 (1970).
41. Schmitthoff, supra note 4, at 109.
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than to prevent alienating their French customers. Or, more than
likely, the firm was originally registered there and later acquired
by the MNC. These host countries then could claim control over
subsidiaries organized and/or located within their border based
upon simple citizenship.
International law has, therefore, seemingly provided legal justi-
fications for contradictory theories of controL Concerning the na-
tionality of corporations, it might be best to agree that it is an in-
dividual state matter to be internally determined under particular
considerations of public policies.42 Both home and host countries
could cite authority for their jurisdiction from international law.
Similarly, both countries may have already developed legal prece-
dents within their national law justifying their attempts at con-
trol, as evidenced by the United States.
The backdrop for conflict is set. A basic tenet of international
law holds that it is the duty of every nation to abstain from any act
which constitutes a violation of another nation's territorial or per-
sonal sovereignty.43 The United States has espoused this theory,
the Supreme Court holding:
[flor another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the
actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those
of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust but
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign,
contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state concernedjustly might resent.44
Applying this view to the previously discussed Ford incident,
for example, American sanctions on the Ford MNC for an action
in Canada and not illegal under Canadian standards would seem
to be such "interference" which Canada "justly might resent." It
is apparent that,
[o]ne of the most sensitive nerves of a state is its territorial sov-
ereignty. When a foreign government infringes that sovereignty
by seeking to control the actions of corporations within that state,
contrary to the state's economic and foreign affairs policies, a re-
action may be expected. 45
Foreign governments, rightly or wrongly, see the MNC as a con-
duit for American governmental decisions, a vehicle for the ex-
42. OPPENHEm, supra note 22, at § 293 n.3.
43. Id. at § 125.
44. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
45. Craig, supra note 40, at 597.
portation of home country law into the affairs of the host nation.46
In foreign eyes, MNC's lose their multinational character and be-
come American world wide corporations.47 The problem becomes
even more explosive when the American law given extraterritorial
effect is based upon political considerations of the cold war, with
which the host country might strongly disagree. This is the area
of present concern. The Trading with the Enemy Act 48 and subse-
quent regulations under it49 are based on the highly political deci-
sion of the United States to deprive Red China and other desig-
nated countries of goods and trade.50 At the same time Canada,
France and Great Britain have all allowed or even encouraged
trade with Red China.51
As the final step in a logical progression, a fear has developed
in other countries of complete economic and social dominance by
the United States. As warned by a publisher-editor of a French
newsmagazine, unless corrective measures are taken by European
countries,
[t]he European elite would be trained at Harvard, Stanford, or
Berkeley, continuing a precedent that has already begun. This
elite would no doubt worm itself into a kind of Atlantic oligarchy,
and even gain some influence over its decisions....
A few leading firms, subsidiaries of American corporations,
would decide how much European workers would earn and how
they would live-work methods, human relations on the job, stand-
ards for wages and promotions, and job security...
American capital and American management will not stop short
at the gates of our society. No taboo will be too sacred to keep
these managers from crossing the threshold of the European sanc-
tuary.52
What he fears is more than economic exploitation, it is the com-
plete loss of culture, identity and self-determination. 53
Intrusion upon the sovereignty of the host country, causing an-
gry reactions and perhaps whispers of fear within them, has fol-
lowed from American attempts at controlling foreign subsidiaries
of United States based MNC's. Having already seen that the host
countries have a legal basis for exerting their own control, it may
seem surprising that they have not done so, especially considering
46. Rubin, supra note 15, at 10.
47. Baum, supra note 12, at 419 n.24.
48. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (1970).
49. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500, 505, 515, 520 (1972).
50. Corcoran, supra note 10, at 184-85.
51. Craig, supra note 40, at 597, and Corcoran, supra note 10, at 192-93.
52. J. SERvAN-ScHREER , THE AmrmcAx CHALLENGS, 191-92 (R. Steele
transl. 1968) as cited in Baum, The Global Corporation: An American Chat-
Zenge to the Nation-State? 55 IowA L. REv. 410, 413 (1969).
53. Baum, supra note 12, at 412-13.
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the immediate jurisdictional and actual physical powers they hold.
Taking the host countries' point of view, however, the reasons for
their reluctance become apparent. To begin with, the economic
power of ANC's is substantial and due to needed investments in
their countries, hosts have little desire to antagonize the parent
corporation. Besides, there is no real complaint with the ANC, the
home country itself is the real target for complaint. It simply does
not make good sense for a host country to attenuate its own eco-
nomic growth by striking at the global corporation under a pretext
of national sovereignty. 54 The entity intruding upon that sover-
eignty is not the company, but in most cases the United States it-
self. The host country is therefore taking on a somewhat larger
adversary if it wishes to correct the problem.
Another difficulty lies in the characteristics of the MNC. If the
host country wishes to risk antagonizing the global corporation by
adversely controlling a subsidiary located in its jurisdiction, it has
in reality grabbed only a single tentacle of the many-armed octo-
pus whose nerve center and other branches are located elsewhere.55
The MNC would seem to have a number of actions open to it, not
the least of which is moving the subsidiary to a more receptive
nation. The host country has little effective control over the MNC
itself, and even if it nationalized the subsidiary, international law
requires that compensation be given.56 More importantly, what
MNC would ever again consider investing in that country?
The result appears to be that the host nation is found tolerating
a limited amount of United States infringement on its sovereignty
in exchange for the economic benefit derived from having an
American based MNC investing and doing business in its country
through subsidiaries. Once American control has become too pain-
ful however, some nations, as we shall see, have succeeded in break-
ing this strangle hold. A study of the specific United States laws
under which foreign control has been achieved is now in order.
III. UNITED STATES ATTEMPTS AT CONTROL
The United States strictly limits trade with Communist coun-
tries by regulations issued under the Trading with the Enemy
54. Id. at 436.
55. Vagts, supra note 18, at 254.
56. Id. at 253-54.
Act. 7 Originally passed in 1917 as a wartime measure, the Act was
amended in 1933 to apply also during any other period of Presi-
dentially declared national emergency. The current period of
emergency commenced in 1950 with the advent of the Korean con-
flict and has continued uninterrupted to this day."8  Section 5(b)
provides, in part:
During the time of war or any other period of national emer-
gency declared by the President, the President may, through any
agency that he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules
and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions,
licenses, or otherwise ... (b) investigate, regulate, direct, and com-
pel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit any acquisition, holding, with-
holding, use, transfer, withdraw, transportation, importation or ex-
portation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or priv-
ilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to thejurisdiction of the United States .... 59
Authority under the Act has been delegated by the President to
the Department of the Treasury and administered therein by the
Office of Foreign Assets Control. 60 Regulations issued by the
Treasury are grouped in four sets. The first set is titled Foreign
Assets Control Regulations 1 which places a complete trade em-
bargo on dealings with certain "designated nations" by all persons
"within" or "subject to the jurisdiction of" the United States.6 2
Designated nations as currently listed consist of Red China, North
Korea and North Viet-Nam, 63 and persons within or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States are defined as:
(1) Any person, wheresoever located, who is a citizen of the
United States;
(2) Any person actually within the United States;
(3) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United
States or of any State, Territory, Possession, or district of the
United States; and
(4) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organiza-
tion, wheresoever organized or doing business, which is owned,
or controlled by persons specified in subparagraph (1), (2), or (3)
of this paragraph.6 4
As can readily be seen, subparagraph (4) is of paramount im-
57. Congress possesses this authority under the Commerce Clause, U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
58. Proc. No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950).
59. 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1) (1970).
60. Exec. Order No. 9193, 3 C.F.R. 1174 (1938-48 Comp.); Exec. Order
No. 9989, 3 C.F.R. 748 (1943-48 Comp.).
61. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (1972).
62. 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1972).
63. Id.
64. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.329-.330 (1972).
[voL. 11: 206, 1973] Comments
SAN DIlGO LAW RVIEW
portance since it allows the United States to assume jurisdiction
over the foreign subsidiaries of American MNC's irrespective of
nationality. This is the language used to impose sanctions, thereby
influencing the export dealings of foreign subsidiaries. Any per-
son defined in these regulations must seek a license from the Treas-
ury Department if he wants to deal with the designated nations.
Following the warming of relations between Washington and Pe-
king, these restrictions have been loosened with respect to Red
China and now allow automatic licensing for nearly all goods not
originating in North Korea or North Viet-Nam.6 5 In regard to
those two countries, however, the complete embargo is still in ef-
fect. Penalties imposed for willful violations are criminal in nature
and as defined in the Trading with the Enemy Act66 constitute up
to ten years imprisonment or a $10,000 fine, or both.
The second set of regulations issued by the Treasury is entitled
Regulations Prohibiting Transactions Involving the Shipment of
Certain Merchandise Between Foreign Countries,6 7 and generally
limits the trading of certain strategic commodities to all Communist
countries excepting Cuba and Yugoslavia. 68 A 1970 amendment
loosened these restrictions to all nations but Red China, North
Korea, North Viet-Nam and Tibet, and allows trading of those
commodities to all other Communist nations if shipment is made
via certain Western countries. 69
In conformity with the Assets Control Regulations, these regu-
lations also apply to all persons "within" or subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States,70 thereby asserting U.S. authority over
the foreign subsidiaries of American MNC's. Penalties are the
same.
71
A third set of controls is the Cuban Assets Control Regula-
tions,72 which places a complete trade embargo on Cuba. There
is a substantial difference in its application, for it does not purport
65. 31 C.F.R. § 500.547 (1972).
66. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (3) (1970).
67. 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-.60 (1972).
68. The strategic items are listed in the Commerce Department's Com-
modity Control List, identified by the letter "A", 15 C.F.R. § 399 (1973).
69. 31 C.F.R. § 505.31 (1972).
70. 31 C.F.R. § 505.10 (1972).
71. 31 C.F.R. § 505.50 (1972).
72. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.809 (1972).
to bind "... any non-banking association, corporation, or other
organization, which is organized and doing business under the
laws of any foreign country. .... -73 Just as surprisingly, no per-
son will be deemed engaged in trade with Cuba merely because
he has a financial interest in a foreign corporation that is involved
in such trade.74' This apparent retreat from former assertions of
the United States is of particular importance since the Cuban reg-
ulations were not promulgated until 1963, after foreign discontent
with the extraterritorial application of the first two sets of regu-
lations had been registered. It may be that the change was a direct
response to unpleasant experience with the earlier controls.75 If
this is true, the United States may have turned the corner in its
attempted controls in the future. One wonders, however, whether
other informal controls, which will be examined shortly, have
lessened the necessity for these highly visible and antagonistic
statutes. In other respects the Cuban controls follow the other
regulations. Licenses are still required for trading,76 and the same
penalties are imposed. 77
The fourth and final set of regulations, the Rhodesian Sanctions
Regulations,7" imposes a general embargo on trading with Southern
Rhodesia. These regulations are not based on the Trading with
the Enemy Act, but instead find their authority in a statute au-
thorizing the President to impose trade restrictions in response to
decisions of the United Nations Security Council.79 The important
point of these controls is that they also fail to include American
owned or controlled foreign based corporations within their juris-
diction.80 The implications are the same as those drawn from the
Cuban Regulations.
At this point it should be noted that other, non-official, forms
of persuasion are present. The United States attempts to secure
compliance with its embargoes by use of informal pressures on the
American parent companies. These include threats of adverse
publicity against the parent in the United States.81 In this regard
it is understandable that an American corporation would prefer
73. 31 C.F.R. § 515.541(a) (1972).
74. 31 C.F.R. § 515.541(e) (1972).
75. Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls Past, Present and
Future, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 791, 869 (1967).
76. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1972).
77. 31 C.F.R. § 515.701 (1972).
78. 31 C.F.R. §§ 530.101-.809 (1972).
79. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
287c (1970).
80. 31 C.F.R. § 530.307(4) (1972).
81. Corcoran, supra note 10, at 181.
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the American purchasing public not know its foreign subsidiary
has been trading with North Viet-Nam or North Korea. Sales are
likely to take a sharp drop. Similarly, the authorities may threaten
future difficulties in securing governmental contracts.8 2  Consid-
ering the size of the Federal budget, this could be a harsh blow
to any corporation used to a share of the pie. While both these
methods are non-statutory, the strength of the pressure they exert
for compliance must be recognized.8 3 As a former Chief Counsel
for the Office of Foreign Assets Control has said, ". . . the United
States has been quite successful so far in persuading American par-
ent firms to take steps on a voluntary basis to ensure that their
foreign affiliates did not trade with Cuba."8 4 There is no reason
to believe his statement would not apply equally to any country
currently on the United States' blacklist.
Apart from the regulations themselves is the manner of their
implementation. In this area the Treasury Department has per-
formed something akin to wizardry. To begin with, it has been
careful to keep its enforcement and license application procedures
within the United States borders, even though the language of the
regulations asserts global jurisdiction.85 This procedure is advan-
tageous because it prevents the highly visible and assuredly an-
tagonistic spectacle of a foreign corporation dealing directly with
the United States government in order to carry on its export busi-
ness. The Treasury still retains tight control, however, for it exer-
cises authority instead on those over whom it has clear jurisdiction
-U.S. citizens and corporations who own and control the foreign
fMMs.8 6 It seems certain that threats of criminal penalties against
American directors or shareholders of foreign firms will suffice
to assure these firms' compliance with the United States trade em-
bargo.87
In furtherance of this almost conspiratorial arrangement, par-
ent firms often demand original receipt of all incoming orders and
82. Id.
83. Id. at 199.
84. Sommerfield, Treasury Regulations Affecting Trade with the Sino-
Soviet Bloc and Cuba, 19 Bus. LAW 861, 868 (1964).
85. Corcoran, supra note 10, at 184.
86. See Vagts, supra note 18, at 251.
87. No actual prosecutions have been sought. Corcoran, supra note 10,
at 182.
subsequently screen them before they are ever seen by the sub-
sidiaries.88 This prevents the host country from knowing orders
have even been offered one of its corporations, for the firm itself
may never learn of it. Professor Vagts has said that only "a low
profile and quick footwork" will prevent this extraterritorial as-
sertion of authority from making trouble for the United States.8 9
The Treasury Department has done an admirable job of accom-
plishing just that. It would be misleading to imply no foreign
opposition exists, however. Substantial resistance and direct ac-
tion have already resulted.
IV. RESPONSE OF VARIous NATIONS TO UNITED STATES
ATTEmPTS AT CONTROL
Reaction to United States enforcement of the control regulations
has varied with the country whose sovereignty has been threat-
ened. In some instances vigorous opposition has been voiced,90 in
others there have been quiet and unpublished diplomatic pro-
tests,91 and in at least one country legal institutions may have
developed to counteract the regulations.92 The Treasury Depart-
ment has admitted itself that enforcement is impossible without
raising many foreign policy issues with our allies,93 and discus-
sions of the problem have resulted in governmental reports94 as
well as private books.95 Concentrating on three of our largest al-
lies, then, an examination of governmental responses will be made,
attempting to develop a generalized statement concerning each in-
dividual country.
As might be expected from frequent disagreements with the
United States over foreign policy, the French reaction has been
strong. Aside from a best selling book forecasting doom unless
American influence in French and European affairs is met and
turned back,98 a classic episode of conflict resulted in a remark-
able decision in the French courts. 97 In late 1964, the French pres-
88. Id. at 199.
89. Vagts, supra note 18, at 252.
90. Craig, supra note 40, at 593.
91. Berman & Garson, supra note 75.
92. Craig, supra note 40, at 580.
93. Haight, United States Controls over Strategic Transactions, 1965 U.
ILL. L.F. 337, 353.
94. See, e.g., the Watkins Report, supra note 11.
95. See, e.g., J. SERVAN-ScHREIHER, THE Am=cAw CHALLENGE (R. Steele
transL 1968).
96. J. SERVAx-ScHREBER, supra note 52, at 414. The book sold over
500,000 copies in Europe its first three months, more than any other book
since WW II, Baum, supra note 12, at 412.
97. Freuhauf Corp. v. Massardy, [1968] D.S. Jur. 147, [1965] J.C.P. II
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ident of Fruehauf-France, S. A., a French corporation in which the
Fruehauf Corporation of the United States held a two-thirds stock
interest and five of eight seats on the board of directors, entered
into a contract with Automobiles Berliet, S. A., France's largest
manufacturer of trucks. The contract called for delivery of sixty
Fruehauf vans, valued at 1,785,310 francs,98 which would be inte-
grated with Berliet trucks for eventual delivery to Red China.
The United States Treasury subsequently ordered the American
parent to suspend execution of the contract as a violation of its
regulations,99 and the American corporation instructed Fruehauf-
France to cancel.
Fruehauf-France approached Berliet about rescinding, but the
latter refused and threatened to sue for approximately $1 million
in damages if Fruehauf breached. The French directors of Frue-
hauf-France, maintaining they were responsible for the welfare of
the company to all of its shareholders, then acted independently.
Alleging that failure to perform the contract would weaken the
company's ability to obtain further contracts with Berliet, which
with 40 percent of its business was Fruehauf-France's largest cus-
tomer, and citing the potential damage to the company by the
threatened $1 million action, the directors brought suit against the
American directors of the company and its American parent. Their
motion for appointment of a judicial administrator to head Frue-
hauf-France for three months and execute the Berliet contract was
granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals of
Paris.
The court's ruling appears to have been based on use of the
French concept of abus de drois (abuse of a legal right) to reverse
the corporate decision which, though promulgated by a majority
of directors, was contrary to the corporate interest. 00 Under this
theory, directors must exercise corporate power within limits of
the "contract" under which the shareholders were united. This
contract calls, basically, for joint pursuit of the common good.
14,274 bis (cour d'appel, Paris). An English language report of the case
can be found in 5 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS: CUnRsN DOcumENTS
476 (1966) and in Craig, supra note 40, at 580-82. The author's version of
the facts are based entirely upon these sources.
98. Equivalent to approximately $358,000 at 1965 values.
99. 31 C.F.R. § 505.01-.60 (1972).
100. Craig, supra note 40, at 581-82..
Differences of opinion as to where the "common good" lies are to
be expected however and the search for it is acceptable if made in
good faith, personal interests of the directors giving way to the
corporate interest. Use of the theory is limited to cases where it
can be shown the majority intended to prejudice the minority's
rights or to obtain personal advantage, and due to difficulty in
proof had previously been applied to only the most flagrant cases
of bad faith.
In Fruehauf the court apparently viewed the decision to cancel
the contract as motivated solely by a desire of the American ma-
jority directors to avoid personal liability under the Trading with
the Enemy Act. This move was illegal since such motivation was
extraneous to the corporate interest. The real importance of the
decision, however lies in its implication that greater French regu-
lation of foreign controlled corporations is now possible and will
be exercised in the future.101 This innovative application of a
principle of French law to prevent American control of the sub-
sidiary may well point the way to the abandonment of future at-
tempts at regulation under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
France not only has a viable and legally based method for curtail-
ing United States sanctions in cases such as this, its use may se-
cretly be welcomed by 1INC's such as Fruehauf for promoting
business with Communist countries and preventing the resulting
personal liability. 02
Examining next the reaction of Great Britain, it becomes appar-
ent that its legal institutions are not as well developed in their
dealings with MNC's as those of France. Two cases decided in
1971 were only the first instances in which MNC's had been be-
fore the English courts. 03 Though the cases do not completely de-
termine how Great Britain will react to American regulations con-
trolling subsidiaries domiciled there, they are the foundation upon
which the English equivalent to Fruehauf may someday be based
and for that reason deserve study.
In Decro-Wall, S. A., v. Marketing, Ltd.,04 the plaintiff was a
French company with head offices in Paris, half of whose stock was
owned by another French firm, the balance held by an American
corporation. The defendant on the other hand, was an English
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Schmitthoff, supra note 4, at 107.
104. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 361 as reported in Schmitthoff, supra note 4, at
106-07. The author's version of the facts is based entirely upon this report
of the case.
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company importing and selling Decro's goods in the United King-
dom. Decro sued in the English courts on matters relating to an
alleged repudiation and termination of contract, but failed to
achieve the relief it sought.
The case shows that English courts will assume jurisdiction
over foreign subsidiaries of MNC's who seek the benefit of English
law. Beyond that, the author also suggests that the court's willing-
ness to treat Decro as the sole entity involved rather than seek the
appearance of its French and American parents could be used as
precedent for the future holding of an American subsidiary in
England to be fully English and thereby not bound by laws of
the United States.
The second case, Acrow Automation Ltd., v. Rex Chainbelt, Inc.
and Another,0 5 concerns two American :MNC's and their dealings
with a British firm. The case's importance lies in the manner in
which the English courts exerted jurisdiction over the foreign cor-
porations and their subsidiaries. As to one MNC the problem was
solved because the firm had registered in England as an overseas
company and provided an address there for service of process. The
other American INC, while apparently not so registering, con-
veniently stipulated the proper law of the licensing agreement it
had entered into with the local firm to be English. The courts
based their jurisdiction on this fortuitous circumstance.
The meaning of these two decisions for the future is not alto-
gether clear. What would happen to an American subsidiary in
England whose parents had not registered as an overseas com-
pany? Would the courts hold that subsidiary English under the
Decro decision? If not, would they be able to claim jurisdiction
over it if its contracts did not provide for construction under Eng-
lish law?
Doubts in this regard have led to a call for new legislation that
would merely require a corporation to carry on substantial busi-
ness in Great Britain for the courts to gain jurisdiction. 10 6 What-
ever the outcome of this suggestion, however, it appears certain
105. [19711 1 W.L.R. 1676 as reported in Schmitthoff, supra note 4, at
107-08. The author's version of the facts is based entirely upon this re-
port of the case.
106. Id. at 109-10.
England is on the way to development of legal doctrines for com-
bating foreign control of subsidiaries located and doing business
within Great Britain.
In comparison to France and England, Canada has taken rela-
tively little action in the area, and case law is similarly lacking.
The Ford incident in early 1958 first brought the Trading
with the Enemy Act to public and, apparently, governmental at-
tention in Canada,107 and its impact, while vocal, 108 produced no
legislation to deal with the problem. 10 9 This is surprising, for it
is from Canada that most reported incidents of direct United
States control over subsidiaries have emerged.110
Returning to the Ford incident, however, it is revealing to study
the Canadian response to American control over its automotive
industry. It must first be noted that Canada could not realistically
nationalize the American auto manufacturing plants. The indus-
try has so developed that not all the required auto parts for as-
sembly are produced in Canada, but rather in other sibling corpo-
rations of the American parent. These parts are then distributed
at low cost through the MNC itself. For Canada to import those
parts on a regular trade basis would render the cost of the fin-
ished product prohibitive for the Canadian consumer."' Since
one of every seven Canadian jobs depends on the automobile indus-
try,1 2 the results might well be disastrous.
Long after the Ford incident exploded in 1958, the Canadian gov-
ernment entered into the Canadian Automobile Agreement of
1965.11 In their negotiations with the American M/NC's, the Ca-
nadians demanded and received a larger percentage of the total
manufacturing operations. Instead of demanding more independ-
ence for its subsidiaries then, Canada actually increased its depend-
ence on the American firms by opting for material well being de-
rived from higher employment, lower car prices and better Ca-
nadian balance of payments." 4 Indeed, Canada's high standard of
living is seen as a direct result of permitting a massive inflow of
foreign investment capital to develop resources and industry." 5
107. See Corcoran, supra note 10, at 190.
108. See, e.g., the opening quotation.
109. Corcoran, supra note 10, at 196.
110. Corcoran, supra note 10, supplies eight reported incidents.
111. Baum, supra note 12, at 422-23.
112. Id. at 421.
113. Id. at 426.
114. See, Baum, supra note 12, at 424-26.
115. Corcoran, supra note 10, at 187.
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Sometimes, however, this quest for prosperity has backfired. 1 6
In 1958 the Aluminum Company of Canada Ltd. (ALCAN) was the
sole aluminum reduction and milling entity in Canada. It was
owned and controlled by widely held individual American share-
holdings. 1958 was also a period of economic recession in Canada,
with wide unemployment in the aluminum industry. In spite of
this, ALCAN refused a $1 million Red Chinese order for aluminum.
Faced with prosecution and discrimination problems in the United
States market if it accepted the order, and on the other side of the
border, problems in Canada if it applied to the United States Treas-
ury for a license to sell to China, ALCAN chose the path of least
resistance and did not accept the order at all. Here Canada's eco-
nomic well being was actually damaged by the Canadian subsid-
iary.
In Canada then, even though feelings may run high against the
Trading with the Enemy Act as an "offensive piece of legisla-
tion, ' ' i'7 it appears that Canadians are still willing to go along
with what they view to be the best solution--continued political
and diplomatic pressure on the United States to withdraw the ap-
plication of the regulations as they apply to controlled Canadian
corporations' export business." 8 The dramatic confrontations with
the United States possible in France and perhaps England are not
likely to occur in Canada. Perhaps "Canada [has] already been in-
tegrated economically with the United States."1 9
V. OUTLOOK FOR Thm FUTURE
Multinational corporations have come of age. The economic con-
trol they will achieve within the decade is forecast to remain rela-
tively constant throughout the end of the twentieth century, 20
and their concentration in the United States is documented and
likely to continue.' 21 The same cannot be said, however, for the
United States' dominant position in the world. The financial in-
fluence that once held the world at bay has lessened, "Sound as a
116. Id. at 180. The following example is based entirely upon this re-
port of the incident.
117. Corcoran, supra note 10, at 208.
118. Id.
119. Baum, supra note 12, at 430.
120. Vagts, supra note 18.
121. Id. at 250.
Dollar" becoming something of a backhanded compliment. Former
leadership of the Western Bloc has deteriorated into attempts at
cajoling a disarray of independents. Unquestioned American mili-
tary superiority has lost something in the jungles of Southeast
Asia.
Accompanying this decline in the economic and military dom-
inance of the United States has been increased dissatisfaction with
American control over foreign subsidiaries. Note that the first ma-
jor defeat of export controls did not occur until 1968,122 and several
nations are currently in the process of developing or have devel-
oped legal institutions to circumvent this infringement upon their
sovereignty. The stage therefore appears set for a greater erosion
of the extraterritorial effect of the Trading with the Enemy Act
in the future.
The current period of "goodwill" between the United States and
most Communist countries should be used wisely in Washington.
It is during this present lull that a long, hard look should be taken
at future attempts to control foreign subsidiaries. Difficult as it
is to accept, new hostilities are bound to break out, new enemies
certain to take their place in opposition to the United States.
America must decide if the risk of alienating such allies as Canada,
France and Great Britain is worth ,depriving such small countries
as North Korea, North Viet-Nam and Cuba of our trade. If fu-
ture attempts at control produce greater opposition, if American
influence continues to dwindle, if MNC's are caught in a bind be-
tween conflicting regulations because of American foreign policy,
the United States may see not only a loss of allies, but a loss of
economically vital MNC's as well. Perhaps the time has come at
last for the United States to "let Canada sell where she wants to
sell."M23
JACK W. HoDGES
122. The author is referring to Freuliauf Corp. v. Massardy (1968),
which he feels represents the first successful attempt to curtail the effect
of U.S. control. It is important to realize that it was accomplished with-
out any negotiation or dealings with the United States government.
123. See the opening quotation.
